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Abstract
In recent years, political and financial economists and other social sci-
entists have begun adopting spin and lattice models into their theoretical
tool kit. This article introduces examples of how these models are used,
and points to some state of the art references. For illustration, a simple
dynamical model of how legal rules evolve and propagate in the Anglo-
American court system is described.
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Academic Year Fellowship in Law and Economics at Stanford Law School and
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1 The Common Law as an Evolutionary System
Almost two centuries ago, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote “The life of
the law has not been knowledge: it has been experience. The felt necessities
of the time, ... avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share
with their fellow men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism
in determining the rules by which men [are] governed.” Likewise, the German
legal scholar Friedrich Karl von Savigny wrote that “All law... is first developed
by custom and [conventional morality], next by jurisprudence,—everywhere,
therefore, by internal silently-operating powers, not by the arbitrary will of a
law-giver.”
Holmes’ “felt necessities” and von Savigny’s “internal silently-operating
powers” have not gone unnoticed by modern scholars. Modern legal scholars,
ranging from Grant Gilmore to Lawrence Friedman, have observed that changes
in law at various times are “rapid and violent,” “clean and swift,” and “highly
fluctuating” (Yee 2001). In current events, a growing branch of intellectual
property, “cyberspace law,” has emerged almost overnight in response to tech-
nological innovations and business needs. Moreover, capital markets anticipate
such changes in a rational way (Yee 2005, 2006).
Hence, it comes as no surprise that Holmes’ “felt necessities” and von
Savigny’s “internal silently-operating powers” drive the basis of an evolutionary
framework for understanding the developement the common law (Priest 1977;
Rubin 1977). The idea is based on Darwinian natural selection: efficient legal
rules survive while inefficient rules are culled out by litigation. In the long run,
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Figure 1: A Darwinian evolutionary system evolves in time as follows. At any
time step t, there is a population of individuals. Mutual competition establishes
a fitness rating for each individual. The population then undergoes natural se-
lection based on the fitness rating, selective reproduction, and (usually random)
mutations. This process yields a new population of individuals at time t + 1,
the subsequent time step.
the common law contains only rules that survive legal and political challenges.
While this paradigm is appealing, it has not yielded empirically refutable pre-
dictions which would seriously test the model.
This article introduces a dynamical model of common law evolution orig-
inally described in Yee (2001). According to this model, evolution leaves an
inevitable trail of paleontological footprints which may be sitting in the West-
law dunes awaiting empirical identification by legal excavators.
Biological evolution starts with a collection of genes (random degrees of
freedom) created by chance chemistry in the earth’s primordial atmosphere.
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These early genes competed against each other to survive and replicate. Ulti-
mately, the biological structures we see today, including their inorganic byprod-
ucts such as computer software or the price of wheat futures emerged from this
competition. Emergence is not imposed exogenously. Rather, structures emerge
inevitably from natural selection, which in turn is an inherent consequence of
competitive interactions and selective reproduction.
Natural selection and evolution does not only occur in a biological setting.
Any system is evolutionary if it has the following four ingredients: set of degrees
of freedom or individuals, each ranked by a quality or behavior-based fitness
criterion, a selection process based on the fitness ranking, and a mechanism for
introducing (usually random) mutations to periodically interject diversity into
the reproductive process.
The common law has these four ingredients. As depicted in Figure 2,
precedents of the common law are the “individuals” undergoing Darwinian evo-
lution. A precedent’s “economic efficiency” is the degree to which it balances
between legal and political forces. Economic efficiency plays the role of Dar-
winian fitness. The fitness-preferring selection process is provided by the premise
that inefficient precedents are subject to more challenges (either in the courts or
in the legislature) and hence are more subject to alteration than efficient ones.
Mutations are introduced by the volatile nature of litigation or legislation.
As pointed out by many authors, notably Priest (1977) and Rubin (1977),
common law precedents tend to evolve towards economic efficiency because inef-
ficient precedents are selectively challenged and ultimately culled away as judges
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Figure 2: Interpretation of Figure 1 when the evolving system is the common law
(or any precedent-based legal regime). At any time step t is a collection of laws
or precedents. As these precedents are applied to regulate social and economic
activity, disputes arise concerning their meaning and social desirability. Ac-
cordingly, lawsuits (or legislative challenges) seeking to overturn the precedents
in controversy are filed. One precedent is more legally “fit” than another if it
suffers fewer such challenges. Copies of the unchallenged (and hence the fittest)
precedents survive intact to reign at subsequent time step t+1. The challenged
precedents, facing judicial modification or termination with each litigation, have
a decreased chance of unaltered survival. Moreover, all precedents (challenged
and unchallenged) are subject to random mutations stemming from external so-
cial pressures which may alter their meaning or applicability at any time. Thus
at each new time step is an evolving common law comprised of precedents which
are selectively reproduced and mutated replicas of their ancestors.
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eventually hit on more efficient and hence less-challenged doctrines even if only
by random trial and error. In this view, the common law is a market of doc-
trines, and a law suit is a bid on a specific doctrine. Intensive litigation moves
this market towards efficiency whether or not judges consciously choose effi-
ciency because inefficient doctrines will be intensively relitigated until they are
efficient.
While this market view is a compelling premise, it is not all there is to
the story. Evolution is more than a push towards improvement. Biological
evolution has provided a rich history of paleontological footprints: punctuated
equilibria, Zipf’s Law, and path-dependency. Accordingly, taking the evolu-
tionary paradigm seriously requires considering its dynamical properties—the
paleontological footprints. In Yee (2001) I propose a dynamical model (“CLM”)
of common law evolution. Cast as parsimoniously as possible, CLM in its sim-
plest guise is mathematically isomorphic to the Bak-Sneppen models (Bak and
Sneppen 1993; see also Yee 1993) and yields interesting paleontology. As dis-
cussed, CLM exhibits punctuated equilibrium, Zipf’s Law, path dependency,
and a stochastic (but statistically robust) form of efficiency I shall refer to as
“smeared” economic efficiency.
2 The Common Law Model (“CLM”)
Economic efficiency of a precedent can change either because (α) the precedent
is altered as a result of a court decision or legislation; or its (β) legal environment
or (γ) social context changes while the precedent itself remains constant. (β)
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recognizes that changes in related laws may induce a change in the economic
efficiency of an unaltered precedent. For instance, a modification of traffic laws
may distort the economic efficiency of a prevailing “reasonable man” standard
in torts without any direct change to the standard itself. Likewise, (γ) says
that social or cultural changes, perhaps driven by technological innovations,
may induce the economic efficiency of a law to change without any changes to
the law itself. In this Introduction, I shall assume that changes in economic
efficiency are due entirely to (α) and (β), not (γ).
With this caveat in mind, my CLM has just two ingredients:
• a set of N ≥ 3 precedents labeled by integers i ∈ I ≡ {1, 2, · · · , N};
• a real-valued economic fitness measure e : I 7−→ [0, 1] where e = 0 repre-
sents the worst and e = 1 the best possible economic efficiency level.
CLM evolves in time according to the following three rules:
• (I) the precedent i litigated at each time step is the one with the smallest
efficiency value e(i);
• (II) litigation of precedent i results in a court ruling which potentially
alters not only i but also i’s neighboring precedents1 i+ 1 and i− 1;
• (III) litigation outcomes are random in efficiency e, that is courts don’t
strive to optimize efficiency. In view of Rule (II), this means a litigation
1I assume that precedent space I wraps around so that i = N and i = 1 are next door
neighbors. This wrap-around assumption has negligible effect on my results when N is suf-
ficiently large (e.g. if N >> 10). In real life, the common law arguably has thousands of
precedents.
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of precedent i results in e(i), e(i − 1), and e(i + 1) each being assigned a
new random value in the unit interval.
These three rules drive CLM. As I shall describe, this minimalistic set
of rules yield a wealth of interesting evolutionary implications for common law
behavior. Rule (I) represents the Rubin-Priest conjecture of selective litigation
of the most inefficient laws. Rule (II) is motivated by (β), that is precedents do
not reign in a vacuum but are interpreted within its legal context at each point
in time. A precedent’s meaning and application—and accordingly its economic
efficiency—depends on the meaning and application of its cousins in legal logic
and, ultimately, on the entire common law. In Rule (II), the multifaceted web
of legal relationships between different precedents is represented by the bold
simplification that changes in precedent i directly influences only its next-door
neighbors.
Rule (III) assumes that litigation results are entirely random with respect
to economic efficiency. While this assumption was selected for its minimalistic
nature, it is not as detached from real life as some practitioners are apt to
believe. In addition to the everchanging mix of judicial philosophies and id-
iosyncrasies flowing in and out of the judicial system, judges also make their
share of mistakes. As it is, even the Supreme Court’s decisions are demonstrably
random in some contexts, such as in at least one area of securities regulation.
A simplified toy model helps elucidate CLM. For the toy model, assume
efficiency of each precedent can take on only three values High, Medium, and
Low, and litigation of one precedent bears no consequences for its neighbors.
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While these assumptions ignore critical elements of CLM—notably Rule II, the
interprecedent interaction rule, it serves as a starting point to develop intuition.
In the earlier rounds of the toy model, one third of the precedents will be
Low, and they will be litigated first. In each trial, two times out of three
the judge will replace the Low precedent with one of a higher score. After
enough rounds of litigation, all the Low precedents will be eliminated, if only
for one round. When all the Low precedents are eliminated, a random Medium
precedent will be litigated in the subsequent time step. There are three possible
outcomes. If the judge offers a High result, lawyers will move on to litigate
other Medium precedents. If the judge offers a Medium ruling, the common
law has not deteriorated. If the judge offers a Low ruling, the Low precedent
will be immediately relitigated, again and again if necessary, until it is restored
to a Medium or High efficiency. Repeated, instantaneous relitigation of a Low
precedent generates a “litigation cluster” in the toy model.
In the toy model, the trend is clear: Low precedents are relitigated relent-
lessly until they become extinct. Subsequently, Medium precedents are culled
until only High precedents remain. Except for short-lived litigation clusters,2
only High precedents survive in the long run. Therefore, the long run equi-
librium state of the toy model is perfectly efficient (except for small litigation
clusters). In equilibrium, High pecedents live at the “edge” of litigation; that is,
as the only surviving precedents, they are randomly exposed to litigation and,
when litigated, are relentlessly rehashed until restored to High efficiency.
2When all the other precedents are High, a litigated precedent has a two thirds chance of
being immediately relitigated.
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The critical difference between the toy model and CLM is due to Rule II.
Rule II, interprecedent interactions, in CLM is responsible for a rich variety of
effects in CLM. Because of interprecedent interactions, High precedents are as
vulnerable to litigation as their Low or Medium neighbors are. In CLM, High
neighbors of a Low precedent are subject to being pulled into the litigation
undertow whenever the Low neighbor is litigated. Since the undertow consists
of up to three precedents, and only one precedent can be litigated at each step,
the efficiency distribution does not collapse into a flat e = 1 peak. Instead,
litigation of a Low or Medium precedent creates a lasting wave of litigation in
the whole surrounding neighborhood. This enhances litigation clusters, creates
valleys of inefficient litigation, and smears out the efficiency distribution.
Real life precedents, like in CLM and contrary to the toy model, do not
act independently of the remaining body of law. Precedents depend on or com-
plement and reinforce one another in a dynamic Charlotte’s web of legal and
logical entanglements. It is precisely the presence of interprecedent entangle-
ments springing from Rule II3 that differentiates CLM from CK. And, as shown
in Yee (2001), it is precisely the dynamics of these entanglements which leave
the paleontological footprints of punctuated equilibria, Zipf’s Law, path depen-
dency, and smeared economic efficiency.
For instance, as depicted in Figure 3, a law exhibits rapid violent change
interspersed with long periods of quiet. This feature occurs endogenously. In
3While one can extend Rule II by introducing next-to-nearest neighbor interprecedent
couplings, in keeping with minimalism I shall focus exclusively on nearest-neighbor couplings.
With only nearest-neighbor couplings, CLM is similar to a physics model (Bak and Sneppen
1993).
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Figure 3: Evolution of a typical precedent’s efficiency value as a function of
time in CLM. While equilibrium is reached some time before the 5 × 104th
time step, the precedent continues to evolve and fluctuate in efficiency. Thus,
equilibrium is not static: while certain collective properties of the system stablize
at equilibrium, individual precedents continue to evolve and mutate.
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CLM, spurts of intense litigation for each precedent are interspersed with irreg-
ular periods of inactivity. Figure 3 depicts the efficiency of a typical precedent
as a function of time.
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